The global financial crisis of 2008 took a heavy toll on government finances worldwide, particularly in developed countries such as the United States, Japan, and members of the European Union. The combination of declining tax revenues and countercyclical stimulus measures has pushed public deficits to levels generally unprecedented in peacetime. Furthermore, these short-term deficits are compounding long-term fiscal deterioration associated with pension obligations and rising health care costs in rapidly aging societies. These factors have given rise to widespread calls for fiscal austerity. 2 In this article, we will first establish that deterioration in public finances is likely to pose a significant long-term problem for major developed democracies in coming years due to three principal factors: 1. Financial crises, which have adverse consequences for economic growth and government finances, are likely to occur with greater frequency and asymmetrically affect advanced democratic states; 2. Demographic shifts, which will lower revenues and necessitate greater expenditures on non-defense priorities such as pensions and health care; 3. Elevated preexisting levels of debt, which have been historically associated with anemic growth, reduced government revenues, and higher financing costs. The confluence of these factors for so many Japanese defense expenditures have consistently fallen for over a decade, and further declines are likely. In short, although remain critically constrained by the realities of fiscal austerity.
Japanese policymakers have responded to this predicament in two ways. First, austerity has provided the impetus for important structural transformations that would have otherwise encountered fierce resistance. Budgetary pressures have driven a historically lethargic defense establishment to accelerate its structural and positioning adaptations to the contemporary security environment in Northeast Asia. Across-the-board personnel cost cuts have also provided political cover to justify a shift of resources into other essential areas. Second, Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have dealt with the obligation to reduce defense spending by allowing military procurement to slow, all the while implementing life extension measures for military hardware already in service. On the surface, this conveys the impression of a Japanese military buildupan increase in the total number of ships, submarines, and to a lesser extent, aircraft. However, these are stopgap measures within a fiscal context that shows no signs of long-term improvement.
With every additional year, obsolescence becomes a real threat to the capacity of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and a sharp decline in military hardware appears all but inevitable in the coming decade.
It would be naive to expect Japan's experience to neatly repeat elsewhere. This article identifies a major, common shock that will shape the course of international security for the foreseeable future. However, common exogenous shocks often solicit widely divergent crossnational responses. Japan's political economy and government decision-making procedures differ from those of the West. Japanese policymakers continue to operate under constraints that other nations' militaries are not subject to, despite considerable changes over the past twenty years -Japan is constitutionally prohibited from making use of offensive military force, and the Three Principles on Arms Exports, or "3Ps," prohibit the Japanese defense industry from selling or sharing of any of the technologies it develops to other sovereign nations. Japan can depend on the U.S. military and nuclear deterrent even as it faces potential reductions in its own military capabilities. On the flipside, the security environment Japan faces, with North Korea and a rising China in close proximity, is arguably more threatening than that confronted by other great powers. It has also been argued that East Asia's unique set of geographical, historical, and political realities make it challenging to draw direct comparisons between East Asian and Western nations. We focus on Japan because it is an interesting country in its own right -a major power in an increasingly important and tense region -and because it offers a longer track record by virtue of being early. However, for all of these reasons cited above, we expect considerable variation in how other countries confront the dual challenge of fiscal austerity and national security. Therefore, we will conclude this article with a broader discussion of caveats, the lessons to be drawn from Japan's experience, and potential directions for future research.
Over the past two decades, Japanese public finances have deteriorated dramatically.
Between 1990 and 2010, Japan's gross public debt to GDP ratio increased from about 50% to 225% of GDP. This is the highest among advanced industrialized nations and second only to Zimbabwe. Net debt is somewhat lower at about 120% of GDP due to cross-holding among various Japanese government agencies and foreign exchange assets. However, even by this measure, Japan is forecast to exceed Lebanon in 2011 as the most indebted country in the world.
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In this section, we will consider the causes underlying the deterioration in Japanese public finances. We posit that Japan's experience is an early example of what is likely to become a much broader phenomenon. Many of the factors that impacted Japan from 1990-2010 are now affecting or likely to affect other advanced industrialized democracies such as the United States and major European states. As such, Japan's attempts to manage defense expenditures under conditions of sustained, adverse financial pressures are not only interesting in their own right, but also hold important implications for other major powers in the international system. These budgetary realities have led to frequent calls for austerity and retrenchment, particularly since the early 2000s. Defense spending, which has accounted for between 5% and 7% of total government expenditures since 1990, has inevitably come under intense scrutiny. This has restricted Japan's flexibility as it confronts several geopolitical challenges, principal among them tense relations with North Korea and the long-term rise of China.
Financial Crisis
In the late-1980s, Japan was swept away by financial mania and speculation. Low interest rates and loose regulation fed a massive asset price bubble in stocks and real estate. Excessive leverage and risky investments were cleverly rebranded as Zaiteku (financial technology), much like the "complex" financial instruments of the 2000s. At the peak of the bubble, Japan's stock market accounted for about half of global capitalization. Although Japan's land area is only about 4% of the United States, Japan's total real estate value was about four times greater. When the bubble burst and asset prices collapsed in the early 1990s, the result was a financial crisis and prolonged economic stagnation that has come to be known as the "lost decade." Repeated attempts to boost the economy through expansionary fiscal policy may have directly contributed upwards of 25% of GDP to public debt. 11 An additional net cost of about 5%
of GDP was incurred in financial sector bailout efforts. 12 Most importantly, the anemic recovery sapped tax revenues -revenues peaked at 60 trillion yen in 1990, and have since then averaged about 48 trillion yen for the past twenty years. 13 Although Japan's crisis stands out in some respects, 14 it is common for public finances to deteriorate sharply following a financial crisis. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff find that real debt increased by 86% on average following crisis episodes in the post-World War II period. 15 This general pattern has also held for countries affected by the US subprime crisis of 2008 -for example, US federal debt held by the public was projected to roughly double between 2007 and 2012. 16 There are reasons to believe that financial crises will become an increasingly common occurrence in coming years, particularly among advanced industrialized democracies. The incidence of crises is closely correlated with cross-border capital flows -historically, peaks in crisis incidence have occurred during episodes of global economic integration, such as the early 20th century and the current period. 17 Liberalized, relatively unregulated economies are more likely to experience crises. 18 In addition, although crises are about as equally likely between developed and emerging economies, 19 there is a strong historical relationship between the incidence of financial crisis and democratic regime type -democracies have, controlling for other factors, been about three times more likely to experience a financial crisis than autocracies.
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In combination, these factors suggest that the incidence of financial crises will continue to be a frequent problem in the future, and particularly among financially liberalized, advanced industrialized democracies such as the United States, Japan, and Western European states.
Importantly, this is not simply a statement about the aftereffects of the 2008 US subprime crisis.
The implication is that there will be more crises akin to those that affected Japan in the 1990s and the US in 2008. If history is any guide, these episodes will continue to exert severe pressure on public finances in these countries. 17 Carmen M. 
Demographics
A more long-term problem for Japan's public finances is the rapid aging of its population.
Japan is going through one of the most rapid demographic transitions in world due to a particularly large baby boom in the immediate post-World War II period followed by a steep decline in births. 21 This demographic profile served Japan well during the postwar reconstruction period by limiting the size of the dependent population -both young and old. This "demographic dividend" contributed positively to Japanese economic growth between 1950 and 1980, but has subsequently worked in reverse, reducing the economic growth rate by perhaps 13 percent between 1980 and 2005.
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One widely accepted measure of demographic pressures is the dependency ratio, which takes the ratio of the dependent population outside of the work force (0-14 and 65+) and divides by the working age population . This measure is a good proxy for potential demographic pressures on government budgets -the working age population is responsible for the bulk of government tax revenues, while the dependent population generally requires net government outlays on programs such as education, health, and pensions. High dependency ratios imply a smaller working age population to support a large dependent population, and hence greater fiscal difficulties for governments. To illustrate our point, we have time-shifted countries other than Japan by the number of years indicated to match Japan's dependency ratio in 2010. For example, the data for Italy has been pulled forward by eight years, so that information for 2018 is depicted as 2010 on the chart. The chart illustrates that Japan's demographic transition is mainly unique for being relatively early.
In the future, all of the countries depicted will reach a dependency ratio comparable to Japan today. The demographic transitions of Germany and Korea, although taking place at a later date, are projected to be more rapid than that faced by Japan, while those for France, the United comparatively better situated according to this measure due to immigration and higher birth rates.
The demographic pressures being confronted by Japan today will be largely replicated across other major economies in the coming decades. Pension and health spending for elderly members of society are notoriously difficult to reduce, particularly in democracies where electoral turnout tends to be higher for this demographic group cross-nationally.
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Figure 1
Note: The dependency ratio is calculated by expressing the dependent population (ages 0-14 and 65+) as a percentage of the working age population . The ratio proxies for the potential fiscal consequences of demographic shifts -a higher ratio implies more dependent citizens per revenuegenerating worker. The data for each county has been pulled forward by the number of years indicated to match the dependency ratio for Japan in 2010. For example, Italy's data for 2008 is plotted as 2000 on the chart (an 8 year time shift). Source: World Bank. 
Public Debt
As a consequence of the factors outlined above, Japan's public debt has been accumulating at an alarming rate. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) predicts that, if left unaddressed, Japan's debt to GDP ratio could exceed 600% by 2040. 25 Even in the optimistic forecast scenario, in which the primary balance is assumed to improve by 1% of GDP per year for five years and age-related spending is frozen at current levels, Japan's debt to GDP would exceed 400% by 2040.
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As distressing as these numbers are, Japan again stands out primarily for being early. States, although it faces a milder demographic transition, is projected to suffer deep deterioration in public finances due to elevated and rising healthcare costs.
This is a remarkably high amount that would be unprecedented for any major economy in modern history. As a reference, Great Britain's public debt during the Napoleonic Wars and World War II peaked at around 250% of GDP.
This debt accumulation, if left unaddressed, may add an additional source of budgetary pressure for policymakers: debt service. It is worth noting that debt service costs in Japan have not increased markedly over the past twenty years, primarily due to low interest rates.
It is an open question whether this feat is repeatable -low nominal rates in Japan have been attributed to factors such as deflation, aggressive monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, and large domestic demand for debt securities driven by high historical savings rates and home bias. Other countries facing large future debt burdens are likely to face sharper increases in debt service costs due to the absence of at least some of these factors. Despite a lower overall debt load, U.S. debt service per GDP is currently higher than that of Japan and projected to remain higher into the future.
Under the BIS baseline scenario, U.S. spending on debt service alone is projected to increase from 5% currently to 23% of GDP by 2040, a figure that approximates total current government outlays.
Of course, these projections themselves are unlikely to be realized. Unlike demographic trends, which are relatively impervious to policy intervention and change slowly, the trajectory of public debt can be altered significantly through political action. What these projections underscore is not that debt will accumulate without limit. Rather, governments, particularly those of economically developed, liberal democracies that constitute the core status quo powers of the contemporary international system, in the coming decades will face sustained budgetary pressure, the likes of which have not been encountered in modern times. Defense expenditures, which are a major line item in the budgets of all of these countries, will inevitably come under scrutiny. As an early example, the experience of Japan deserves careful consideration. This increased presence of Chinese warships in nearby waters is particularly worrisome to Japan given that it relies on marine transport for nearly all of its trade. and involvement in the "war on terror" demonstrates that it is willing to take on more responsibility in the preservation of its security interests. Christopher Hughes goes so far to say that Japan is re-militarizing, paving the way toward revoking Article 9 of its constitution, enabling it to remove constraints on the use of military force.
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The belief that Japan will shed the antimilitarism that pervaded its foreign policy during most of the Cold War and once again become a military power is certainly not a new one.
Kenneth Waltz once predicted:
Much in Japan's institutions and behavior supports the proposition that it will once again take its place among the great powers. In most of the century since winning its Chinese war in 1894-95, Japan has pressed for preeminence in Asia, if not beyond… In recent years, the desire of Japan's leaders to play a militarily more assertive role has become apparent, a natural response to Japan's enhanced economic standing.
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Waltz predicted that Japan would inevitably become a military power despite constraints that exist on its military capability. 36 Waltz went on to forecast that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear threats emanating from China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. This commentator also notes that the JDA can be distinguished for its "lack of fervor", p. 82. 43 The increase in energy-related expenditures by the METI primarily went towards increased subsidies for fossil fuel purchases by Japan, and heightened support for the development of renewable energy technologies. Similar "green budgets" were implemented across many OECD nations at around the same time. Table 1 It is worth noting that defense expenditures are difficult to cut dramatically over a short time period for practical reasons. For one, reduction of personnel expenses are politically difficult. The desire to minimize personnel costs for the Self Defense Forces has resulted in ongoing efforts at MOD to reform the personnel structure. 45 Nonetheless, as large-scale layoffs or salary reductions for military personnel are likely to meet resistance from the targeted groups within the military, particularly logistics personnel, it is unclear whether such personnel management reform will be successful. 46 There are also political costs to reducing personnel, which can result in the closing of bases that support local economies. In addition, while a considerable portion of the MOFA budget is allocated to official development assistance (ODA), which is determined year-to-year, the defense budget has a significant level of expenses committed in previous years due to the practice of spreading costs for expensive items over several years rather than paying in one lump sum (saimu futan koi). This data provides some support for existing accounts that emphasize Japan's military resurgence. According to officials involved in negotiations over the defense budget, the Ministry of Finance has exhibited understanding of the necessity to preserve the resources of Japan's defense establishment, allocating resources so that it can effectively adapt to the changing security environment. 48 Despite severe fiscal pressures, the Japanese government is prioritizing In the most recent National Defense
Program Guidelines, MOD also announced the expansion of its submarine fleet from 16 to 22 to enhance its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
There is no question that China is growing more powerful -both economically and militarily -at an astronomical rate. China's rapid economic growth and strength has allowed it to maintain a growth rate of more than 10% in military spending for nearly 20 years. Some say that amount is perhaps 2 or even 3 times the Chinese government's official figures. Nonetheless, it continues to strengthen and modernize its military power. This is a very real concern. (…) A Chinese nuclearpowered submarine has even made an incursion into Japan's territorial waters. It is important that we not just wait and see, but take a firm response to these kinds of actions. did not trust China, the first one additionally finding that over 70% of Japanese consider China to be a national security threat. The influence of the external threat environment on the final outcome of the defense budget illustrates that Japan's defense budget is subject to two contradictory pressures: the downward pressure emanating from Japan's fiscal predicament and the consequent requirement to curtail the overall budget, and the upward pressure associated with regional threats and greater assertiveness by Japanese leaders. Scholars who predict the reemergence of a Japan as military power have correctly characterized the intention and desires of Japanese policymakers -on a relative basis, the military has increasingly received high priority.
Although much remains to be seen, the Great Tōhoku Earthquake of 2011 may also provide additional advantages to the Japanese defense establishment in budgetary negotiations.
In the short-term, the loss of military hardware in the disaster will justify larger funding 
Public opinion on level of dangers posed to Japan
There is a danger
There is some danger
There is no danger Don't know allocations for procurement -the flooding of Matsushima airbase led to the loss or impairment of 18 F-2 aircraft, which will need to be replaced. 54 The MOD is also highlighting the need for greater capabilities as a means to respond to future disasters. In response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa has committed to the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to deal with future contingencies. 55 Successful efforts at disaster relief, which saw the SDF's largest mobilization of troops since World War II, were very well-perceived, and could enhance the legitimacy and bargaining power of the defense establishment.
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Austerity as a Constraint
Although Japan's defense establishment has received priority within the domestic budget allocation process, austerity has still acted as a significant constraint on Japan's military 
Adapting the Military to Fiscal Austerity
Japan's military establishment has not stood idly by in the face of fiscal austerity. The evolving security environment surrounding Japan led to new security policy priorities in the 2004 NDPG, which downgraded the threat of a territorial invasion of Japan, and later the 2010 NDPG, which emphasized the need for a "dynamic defense force" that would focus on maritime security and the protection of the Japan's EEZ. found that for each additional year of age, the probability for unscheduled maintenance of aircraft rises by 0.8% for land-based aircraft, and by 3.5% for carrier-based aircraft. 83 Even with increased expenditures on maintenance, aging equipment is likely to lead to problems such as Hatsuyuki class destroyers that just had their lives extended -are going to be decommissioned in the next ten years, amounting to a potential reduction of around 30% of Japan's destroyer fleet. 87 Through higher maintenance budgets and life extension mechanisms, Japan has avoided immediate reductions in military hardware. In fact, in terms of submarines and destroyers, Japan has actually built up its military hardware despite sharp reductions in procurement budgets. At present, the defense budget of Japan is still large in relative terms. Even after curtailments, Japan maintains the seventh highest military expenditures in the world, behind the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Germany.
Because of higher unit costs and declining procurement budgets, Japan acquires hardware today at a much slower rate than was feasible in prior decades -e.g. 1 destroyer and 5 fighter jets per year compared to about 3 destroyers and 18 fighter jets per year in the 1980s. This will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to continue its current course of force expansion despite declining budgets. 88 Furthermore, Japan possesses a competent military force boasting high-quality training for its pilots and midshipmen, superior air command and control systems, outstanding marine patrol aircraft, and a strong naval force. 89 However, Japan's current "military buildup" is wholly dependent on what are essentially shortterm coping mechanisms. Aging Japanese military equipment is likely to wreak its effects with each additional life extension measure. In addition, these coping strategies cannot continue indefinitely. Japan faces the prospect of sharp declines in key military hardware in the coming decade. The fiscal predicament is dire, with 48% of Japan's 2010 general account budget funded by government-issued debt. 90 Despite modest success in the early 2000s, Japanese austerity
efforts have yet to stem the tide of rising red ink. The tragic Great Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011 will lead to a heavier fiscal burden on the Japanese government. This raises the prospect that the stopgap measures being undertaken by the Japanese defense establishment will ultimately confront the hard reality that Japan's fiscal problems are hardly temporary in nature.
Conclusion
The politics of fiscal austerity will critically shape the course of international security in coming years. Japan's predicament over the past twenty years illustrates the pressures likely to be confronted by other great powers, particularly advanced industrialized democracies, in the near future. We will conclude by considering the lessons from Japan's example and broader implications for the study of international security. Although Japan's defense establishment confronted the challenges of fiscal austerity a step ahead of other countries, Japan's response should not be naively extrapolated to other cases. As we discussed earlier, Japan's security context is distinct from that of other countries. As such, we do not expect uniformity in 93 Germany has in fact increased its military expenditures by 1.4% for 2011 while cutting overall spending by 3.8%, even though the government is hoping for more significant cuts in subsequent years.
discretionary funds for the conduct of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars). 95 However, the FY 2011 budget, which is more austere, targets a 3.4% increase in defense spending over the previous year combined with a 1.5% decline in non-security-related spending. 96 The Netherlands, on the other hand, has planned for the cut of 10,000 personnel (around one seventh of its armed forces) and 1 billion euros over the next five years, amounting to close to 12% in defense cuts in comparison with around 8% cuts for all government spending. and urban population -may also prove misleading as populations age and more resources are devoted to non-discretionary social programs. An important development in economic growth accounting over the past two decades is the incorporation of demographic factors, which have been shown to explain a considerable degree of variation in cross-national development patterns. 105 Analogously, proxies for national military capabilities ought to be updated to take into account the effects of demographic transition and other drains on public finances. 106 
